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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assessment
Committee (CDAC) , the Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) con-
ducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against an array of
ten (10) tanks simulating a Soviet tank company deployed for an
attack. The CDAT used M-47 tanks stowed with main gun ammunition,
diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew manikins to simulate the
Soviet tanks. The pilots of the attacking A-10 aircraft conducted
firings at low altitudes and dive angles thus simulating condi-
tions below the minimum altitude for their effective engagement by
the opposing air defense (AD) networks employing acquisition and
fire control radar. The purpose of the test was to evaluate the
performance of the Aerojet 30mm API anti-tank ammunition (Lot
Number AJD 79A181-001) , fired from the GAU-8 gun during engagement
of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against realistically simulated
Soviet main battle tanks.
The CDAC assessed the results of the A-10 aircraft cannon
firings against the simulated Soviet tank company as follows:
1. Test Conditions : The target tanks were deployed in
open, flat desert terrain with no cover and little concealment.
Aerial weather conditions provided unlimited ceiling and visibil-
ity. Shortly after the initial firing, clouds of white dust from
projectile impacts were evident. Such conditions effectively simu-
lated the actual degree of target obscuration which would have
been encountered by pilots in combat.
2. Attack Parameters : The pilots of the A-10 aircraft
attacked the simulated Soviet tank company at low altitude and
dive angles. The GAU-8 cannon has cockpit-selectable fire rates
of either 2100 or 4200 rounds per minute, and the system was set
to fire at 4200 rounds per minute during this test. The pilots
made a total of 10 passes, each at a primary tank target, scoring
projectile impacts on 10 tanks. They fired 381 rounds in ten (10)
bursts averaging, 38.1 rounds and 0.62 second per burst.
3. Weapon s Effects : The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system achieved
139 impacts on the 10 target tanks. The ratio of direct impacts
to total rounds fired was 0.26. The weapon system achieved 22 per-
forations of the armored envelopes of the tanks, with a ratio of
perforations to impacts of 0.16. Some projectiles, which did not
perforate armor, damaged exterior track and suspension components
of the tanks, as well as gun tubes.
4. Damage Assessment : The attacking A-10/GAU-8 weapon
system inflicted no catastrophic kills on tanks in the company
array. Five tanks were immobilized, including two tanks with
severly restricted fire power. One tank was deprived of the use
of its main armament. One tank sustained such light damage that
there was no significant degradation of either its mobility or
fire power.
5 * Results ; The breakdown of test results into consti-
tuent parameters is summarily shown in Table I. The average num-
ber of tanks neutralized per single A-10 aircraft attack was 0.60
in terms of total loss of either mobility or fire power. Neutra-
lization in this sense is a top level weapon effectiveness para-
meter. These results were obtained under conditions of open and
flat desert terrain, calm and clear weather, low altitude attacks,
and battle field obscuration by smoke and dust of projectile
impacts. Appendix A further contains graphic and summary data of
this firing, and Appendix B contains the qualitative and quantita-
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Since February, 1978, the Armament Directorate, A-10 System
Program Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has con-
ducted firing tests of the A-10/GAU-8 system in low-level, air-
to-ground engagements of armored targets. The tests have been
conducted within the framework of the GAU-8 30mm ammunition Lot
Acceptance Verification Program (LAVP) - Airborne. The LAVP has
the following objectives in the present tests:
A. To evaluate the performance of existing production lots
of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air under
operational conditions.
B. To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition against
armored targets when fired at low level from A-10
aircraft using operational tactics.
In conducting the LAVP program, the Armament Directorate
cooperated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB,
Virginia, and the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis AFB,
Nevada. Within the framework of that cooperation, the Armament
Directorate has set up a Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) to
plan and execute the firing tests, and to evaluate the results.
The CDAT functions under the direction of a Combat Damage Assess-
ment Committee (CDAC) , which prepared this report.
TEST PHILOSOPHY
To generate realistic data, the CDAC employed an empirical
technique of destructive testing of actual tank targets. Tests
consisted of firings at individual tanks in November, 1977 and
February - March, 1978 and, more recently, at arrays of vehicles
deployed in tactical formations. The experimental setup for the
firings of 4 December, 1979 involved aircraft attacks on a multi-
target, tactically arrayed tank formation by the A-10/GAU-8 weapon
system. The CDAT elected to simulate a Soviet tank company, organ-
ized within a tank division, as the target array attacked by two
A-10 aircraft. Minimum constraints were placed on the attacking
pilots in an effort to develop as much realism as possible. Table
II shows test factors which would have been ideal in the exercise
of 4 December, 1979 and the practical setup which was achieved.
TABLE II. Comparison of Ideal and Practical Test Conditions
Ideal
Test Parameters
1. Air Attack Realism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
configuration
b. 30mm API ammunition




e. Low altitude attack
angle (<-6 degrees)
2 * A J- r Defense (AD) Realism
a. Automatic cannon
firing at aircraft
b. Missile systems firing
at aircraft
c. Small arms firing at
aircraft
d. AD suppression by aircraft
3. Threat Targets and Doctrine
a. Soviet T62/T64/T72 high
fidelity tank targets
b. Combat-stowed loads
in Soviet T62/T64/T72 tanks








1. Air Attack Realism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
configuration
b. 30mm API ammunition




e. Low altitude attack
angle (<-6.0 degrees
average)
























3. Threat Targets and Doctrine
a. Soviet tanks, simulated
by US M-47 tanks
b. Combat-stowed loads
in US M-47 tanks
c. Wooden crew manikins
d. Static combat formation
e. Stationary targets
SIMULATED GROUND COMBAT SITUATION
The firing tests of 4 December, 1979 simulated attacks by the
US A-10 aircraft on a Soviet tank company. The CDAC hypothesized
the Soviet tank company to be the lead march security detachment
for its battalion which, in turn, would be the advance guard of a
larger mobile formation. The lead detachment normally operates
approximately five kilometers in front of the Soviet battalion
column. Its primary mission is to ensure an uninterrupted advance
of the battalion, and to provide security against attack. Upon
meeting heavy resistance, the company either deploys into an
appropriate combat formation in order to reduce the opposition, or
forms a base of fire for offensive action by the remainder of the
battalion, or performs both functions.
A Soviet tank company, simulated in the firing tests, prob-
ably would also have other units attached to it for support that
could include any or all of the following elements: (1) motorized
rifle platoon, (2) engineer detachment, (3) chemical defense spe-
cialists, (4) 122mm howitzer battery, and (5) an air defense ele-
ment. In this case, the lead detachment simulated in the firing
tests consisted of tanks alone. This tank formation was deployed
with two platoons in front and one in the back, simulating an ini-
tial assault posture. The targets used in the firing test were US
M-47 tanks, largely intact, containing crew manikins, and stowed
with ammunition, fuel, and oil. The tanks were not maneuvered
during the firing tests; the formation remained essentially a
stationary snapshot of the company.
TARGET TANKS
The most effective targets, available in sufficient numbers
to simulate Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks (Figure 1) , were the US
M-47 tanks. Both of the Soviet tank models are similar in armor
protection to the M-47. With appropriate purging of the gasoline
fuel system of the US tanks, the CDAT managed to field targets
similar in survivability to the T-55 and T-62 tanks in terms of
their ignitable internal material. Few data are available on
armor protection and the arrangement of internal components in
the Soviet T-64 and later model tanks. The decision was made,
accordingly, to simulate the earlier model Soviet tanks with the
readily available US tank equivalents.
The M-47 tanks, used for targets, were in excellent condition
for damage assessment. Their exterior components were complete,
and the tanks have proven to be effective platforms for realistic
identification of exterior mobility damage. Interior components
were less complete. While all of the most essential items were
present, e.g., main gun, engine, transmission, fuel tanks,
ammunition racks, etc., other items such as oil coolers, range
finders, vision devices, and radios were not uniformly installed
in all tanks.
The following sensitive internal items, which contributed to
catastrophic kills and to high percentage Mobility (M) and Fire-
power (F) kills, were placed in test tanks:
Generic Sensi tive Item Test I tern
1. Ammunition US Cartridge, 90-mm TP-T
2. Fuel Number 2 Diesel
3. Oil Oil in Engine, Transmission
and Drive Components.
4. Personnel Articulated Plywood
Manikins
TEST RESULTS
Tests consisted of exposing ammunition, gun, aircraft,
pilots, and combat-arrayed and loaded tanks to several minutes of
combat simulation. The key elements in the scenario were:
1. Aerojet Ordnance Manufacturing Co. 30mm API ammunition
(Lot Number AJD 79A181-001)
.
2. General Electric GAU-8 Gatling gun.
3. Fairchild Republic A-10 close ground support aircraft.
4. USAF combat pilots























FIGURE 1. Russian T6 2 Medium Tank.
The combat simulation itself comprised aerial fire and appro-
priate maneuvers by the attacking A-10 aircraft. A realistic way
of presenting combat simulation is to outline the sequence of per-
tinent events in each firing pass. These developments, and the
data which CDAT attempted to collect in order to reconstruct the
simulated combat firings of 4 December, 1979, were as follows:
Sequence Event Data
1. Aircraft Approach Speed, Altitude
2. Aircraft Attack Open-Fire Range, Dive Angle
3. Aircraft Attack Burst Time, Rounds Fired
4. Aircraft Attack Cease-Fire Range, Dive Angle
5. Gun Effects, (Accuracy) Impacts on Tanks
6. Gun Effects, (Lethality) Perforations through Armor
7. Tank Damage Catastrophic (K-Kill)
,
Mobility (M-Kill) , and
Firepower (K-Kill)
The data above were collected through combined efforts of the
CDAT and range support personnel at Nellis AFB. Aerojet Ordnance
Manufacturing Company personnel provided the industrial support re-
quired to repair, refurbish, and field the target tanks. The CDAT
applied the research techniques needed to describe weapon effects
and combat damage. The basic materiel used in tests, i.e., the
A-10 aircraft, GAU-8/A guns, and 30mm API projectiles, are illus-
trated sequentially in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. The targets,
arrayed in the tactical formation of a Soviet tank company, are
shown in Figure 6. Actual tank targets used were US M-47 tanks,
depicted in the Damage Assessment section. The original intention
was to obtain airspeed, altitude, burst length, slant range and
dive angle data from the Heads-Up-Display (HUD) gun camera film.
One of the two films of this particular test apparently was
misplaced or destroyed, and efforts to locate it have been
fruitless. Consequently, part of the information provided by HUD
films is not available, and there is no other alternate range
instrumentation data source.
The attacking pilots flew from the base area, and employed
standard operational tactics immediately before the firing passes
by approaching targets at low altitude, and simulating their ini-
tial acquisition with the help of a forward air controller. They
then proceeded to attack the tank company targets at altitudes and
dive angles low enough to simulate operations below minimum effec-
tive altitudes for radar acquisition and engagement by opposing
air defense missile and gun systems.
FIGURE 2. USAF/Fairchild Republic A-10 Close Ground Support
Aircraft.
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Damage assessments, carried out by CDAT, are presented
on the following pages. Appendix A, which follows the de-
tailed damage assessment section and includes applicable air-
craft parameters and weapon effects, contains graphic and
tabular information on the mission.
Terms used in damage assessment summaries are defined in
Appendix B.
Impacts on targets were sequentially but arbitrarily num-
bered for identification purposes, first at turret then at
hull levels. Additional impacts, discovered during combat
damage assessment, were given next sequential numbers, i.e.,
no attempt was made to correct the sequence. THE READER IS
CAUTIONED THAT THIS NUMBERING SYSTEM BEARS NO RELATIONSHIP
TO THE ARRIVAL SEQUENCE OF PROJECTILES ON TARGET, OR TO POR-
TIONS OF BURSTS IMPACTING TARGET TANKS.
15
TARGET TANK NUMBER 52 DAMAGE SUMMARY
1 • Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 52
with 23 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
100 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 30
rounds in the firing pass.
2. Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill, resulting from the









Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
a. M-Kill: A 100% M-Kill was assessed, based on Im-
pacts 16 and 21 which perforated the right hull
armor and penetrated the fuel tank and oil cooler,
and on cumulative damage to the track and suspen-
sion system caused by Impacts 4, 5, 6, and 8.
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed, based on Im-
pacts 1, 2, and 3 which perforated the right tur-
ret, penetrated the fighting compartment, caused
damage to the gunner control panel, destroyed gun-
ner's power control handle, and caused casualties
to the commander
,



















































The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 54
with 13 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
085 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 30
rounds in the firing pass.
2. Kill Assessment ;
65% M-Kill and 70% F-Kill, resulting from the
following observed effects (Figure 8):
a. Perforations : 2
b. Significant Impacts : 1
c. Insignificant Impacts: 1_0_
TOTAL IMPACTS : 13
3» Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 65% M-Kill was assessed, based solely on
the contribution to a mobility kill caused by comman-
der and loader casualties. Mechanical damage to
mobility components was insignificant.
b. F-Kill: A 70% F-Kill was assessed, based on Impact
1 which perforated the right turret and penetrated
into the fighting compartment, severing the power
control wiring harness and causing casualties to the
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 71 DAMAGE SUMMARY
1. Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 71
with 5 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
090 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 30
rounds in the firing pass.
2. Kill Assessment ;




b. Significant Impacts : 1
c. Insignificant Impacts: 4
TOTAL IMPACTS : 5
3« Rationale for Kill Assessment :
The assessment of 100% M-Kill is based on damage
caused by Impact 4 which severed one wedge nut, de-
stroyed one center guide and one end connector (Figure
9), all on one pair of track shoes. This would have




















TARGET TANK NUMBER 50 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 50
with 35 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
086 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 43
rounds in the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill, resulting from the
following observed effects (Figures 10 and 11)
:
a. Perforations : 11
b. Significant Impacts : 5
c. Insignificant Impacts: 19
TOTAL IMPACTS : 35
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: The assessment of 100% M-Kill is based on
Impacts 21, 27, 28, and 33 which perforated the
right hull armor and penetrated the right fuel tur-
ret and two valve covers, and on cumulative damage
to the track and suspension system caused by Impacts
14, 16, and 30. Crew casualties caused by Impacts
2, 5, 7, and 8 contributed to the kill.
b. F-Kill: The assessment of a 95% F-Kill was attribut-
ed to Impacts 2, 5, 7, and 8 which perforated the
right turret armor and caused casualties to the









































































TARGET TANK NUMBER 53 DAMAGE SUMMARY
1 . Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 53
with 19 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
323 degrees (left front) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 46
rounds in the firing pass.
2« Kill Assessment :
100% interdiction type M-Kill and 30% F-Kill,








Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 100% interdiction type M-Kill, based on
cumulative damage to the track and suspension system
caused by Impacts 9, 11, 17, and 18 (Figures 12, 13,
and 14) , which would have caused total track failure
after 5 to 8 kilometers of travel.
b. F-Kill: The assessment of 30% F-Kill is based on
slight wounds to the loader caused by Impact 1,











































































166 15 145 1112 10
NOTE: Impact 16 is on inside of number 1 road wheel
FIGURE 14. Impact Diagram, Target 53, Front
28
TARGET TANK NUMBER 33 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 33
with 4 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
335 degrees (left front) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 57
rounds in the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :





Rationale for Kill Assessment:
No perforations or significant impacts were observed

























TARGET TANK NUMBER 51 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 51
with 5 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
086 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 34
rounds in the firing pass.
Kill Asssessment ;
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following observed




TOTAL IMPACTS : 5
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
The assessment of 100% M-Kill is based on damage to
the right track adjusting idler, caused by Impact 2, and
to Impact 3 which destroyed an end connector and track
center guide on the same pair of track shoes. See

























FIGURE 17. Impact Diagram, Target 51, Front,
33
TARGET TANK NUMBER 57 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 57
with 17 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
326 degrees (left front) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 35
rounds in the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :
100% F-Kill, resulting from the following observed








Rationale for Kill Assessment:
Impacts 3 and 4 jammed the turret, preventing
































NOTE: #17 impacted #4 roadwheel torsion bar
housing.





















TARGET TANK NUMBER 7 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank
7 with 11 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
083 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 35 rounds
in the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :








Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Impact 1 penetrated one wall of the gun tube, causing
a 10% loss of function. The figure presenting impacts on
tank number 7 is not shown. The impact diagram normally
filled out in the field was not completed for tank number
7. A field description of the impacts exists which can
be used to locate the impacts with reasonable accuracy,
e.g., on a specific roadwheel, on a particular area of the
turret, etc.
38
TARGET TANK NUMBER 55 DAMAGE SUMMARY
1. Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on tank 55
with 7 projectiles fired from an attack aspect angle of
078 degrees (right side) during one firing pass at low
altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 41
rounds in the firing pass.
2. Kill Assessment ;
55% M-Kill and 85% F-Kill, resulting from the





TOTAL IMPACTS : 7
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
a. M-Kill: A 55% M-Kill was assessed, based solely on
the contribution to a mobility kill caused by gunner
and loader casualties. Mechanical damage to mobil-
ity components was insignificant.
b. F-Kill: An 85% F-Kill was assessed, based on Impact
3 which perforated the right turret, causing casual-
ties to the gunner and loader and on Impact 1, which





















































On 4 December, 1979 at Nellis AFB, Nevada, the Combat
Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) carried out firings of the
A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against an array of ten (10) tanks,
simulating a Soviet tank company deployed for attack. The
purpose of the test was to evaluate the effects of firing
the 30mm API antitank ammunition out of the GAU-8 gun
against realistically simulated Soviet tank formations. The
CDAT used US M-47 tanks, stowed with main gun ammunition,
diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew manikins to simulate
the Soviet tanks. The pilots of the A-10 aircraft, used in
the firings, conducted their attacks at altitudes and dive
angles low enough to simulate operations below the minimum
altitude for effective engagement by opposing air defense
systems using acquisition and fire control radar. Summary
results of the firing tests were as follows:
Aircraft Parameters
1. Open Fire Speed (average) 579 ft/sec
2. Dive Angle (average) -6.0 degrees
3. Open Fire Slant Range (average) — 2285 feet
4. Burst Length/Rounds (average) 0.62 sec/38.1
5. Number of Passes (primary) 10
6. Target Aspects (predominantly) Left front/right
Weapon Effects Target Damage
1. Rounds Fired 381 1. K-Kills
2. Impacts 139 2. Hi% M+F-Kills- 3
3. Ricochets (off grnd) — 39 3. M-Kills 5
4. Direct Impacts 100 4. F-Kills 1
5. Armor Perforations 22 5. Negligible 1
The data that follow are used to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system as a Soviet
tank killer based upon firing tests that simulated combat
conditions. Results of these firing tests, conducted on
4 December 1979 follow:
41
Measures of Weapon System Effectiveness
Accuracy Related Ratio: Lethality Related Ratio:
Total Impacts (139) = 0.36 Perforations (22 ) = 0.16
Total Rounds Fired (381) Total Impacts (139)
Direct Impacts (100) = 0.2 6 Perforations (22 ) = 0.22
Total Rounds Fired (381) Direct Impacts (100)
Weapon System Effectiveness Ratios:
Tanks Neutralized (6 ) = 0.60 Tanks K-Killed (0) = 0.00
Aircraft Passes (10) Aircraft Passes (10)
The 10 target tanks were attacked predominatly from the
front and sides and suffered damage as presented in Tables
I and A- I.
The data and measures summarized above together with
others contained in this report support the following
inferences or conclusions:
1. The A-10/GAU-8 wapon system under conditions of realis-
tic simulation of combat is capable of inflicting M and F type
kills on the US M-47 main battle tanks and the similarly pro-
tected Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks.
2. The A-1-/GAU-8 weapon system in low- level attacks can
perforate the side and rear armor of the hulls and turrets
of M-47 tanks and the similarly protected Soviet T-55 and T-62
tanks.
3. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system can perforate the side and
rear surfaces of the US M-47 tanks and Soviet T-55 and T-62
tanks when firing short to moderate-length bursts (0.5-0.9 second)
containing 30-60 rounds of 30mm API ammunition.
4. The lethality of GAU-8 30mm API ammunition against com-
bat-stowed main battle tanks shows the tactics of low-level
attacks in this firing test to be successful.
42
APPENDIX A
Graphic and Summary Data
Table A-l contains a summary of the results of mission
25 on 4 December, 1979. Table A-II relates the assessment
of damage in Table A-I to locations of perforations. Table
A-III summarizes the aircraft attack parameters of altitude,
attitude, air speed, firing slant range, and burst length for
each pass on each target. Figure A-l relates the aircraft
attack aspect by firing pass to aircraft range from target
at the beginning and at the end of each burst. The attack
directions are shown as arrows on a plan view diagram of the
simulated combat engagement. The arrows are located at the
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The terms used in this report are defined below:
IMPACT — Any evidence of projectile strike against any por-
tion of the target. Ground ricochets striking the target
are classified as "impacts".
PERFORATION — Complete rupture of the armored envelope of a
tank by an impacting projectile or its spall fragments. A
perforation can only occur when armor is impacted, except in
cases of turret armor discontinuities around weapons, or vi-
sion and ranging devices. The word "perforation" was deli-
berately selected to avoid ambiguities which could occur
through use of the word "penetration". Behind-the-plate
effects may or may not result from a perforation.
HIT — Any impact not classified as a perforation.
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) — Loss of tactical mobility through
damage which cannot be repaired by crew on the battle field.
A tank is considered to have sustained a 100% M-Kill when it
is no longer capable of executing controlled movement on the
battle field. Mobility is DEGRADED when a tank can no
longer maintain position in its formation.
FIRE POWER KILL (F-KILL) — Loss of tactical fire power
through damage which cannot be repaired by crew on the
battle field. A tank is considered to have sustained a 100%
F-Kill when it is no longer capable of delivering controlled
fire from its main armament. Fire power is DEGRADED when a
tank can no longer maintain its normal rate of fire, velo-
city, accuracy, time to shift targets, etc.
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) — A tank is considered to have
sustained a K-Kill when both an M-Kill and a F-Kill have
occurred as the result of killing fires and explosions from
ignited fuel and/or ammunition. Such tank is no longer con-
sidered economically repairable, and , by US standards, would
be abandoned on the battle field.
ATTACK ASPECT — Approach angle of the attacking aircraft to
tank orientation, with zero (0) degrees representing the
front of the tank (gun forward) , and 180 degrees representing
48
ing the rear of the tank. The angle is measured clockwise.
SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS — Impacts which damage systems, compo-
nents or sub-systems up to destruction or partial loss of
function. Such damage contributes to the assessed kill of a
tank .
INSIGNIFICANT IMPACTS — Impacts which damage non-critical
structural, convenience, or accessory components to destruc-
tion or partial loss of function, but without impact on the
mobility or fire power of a tank. Good maintenance
practices provide repair or replacement of such items at the
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